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Abstract
This paper considers the effect of different firm leadership on the innovative
performance of firms from seven EU countries. We investigate whether
owner-led or manager-led firms achieve a larger share of their turnover with
product innovations. Economic theory does not propose clear answers to
this question. In the empirical analysis, it turns out that the manager-led
firms are more active innovators: the share of sales based on new products is
larger if firms' managers do not hold any of the firms' capital. Surprisingly,
there are no differences between the seven countries included in the regres-
sion analysis.
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11 Introduction
It is well known that the traditional textbook model of the owner-led firm is inadequate for
large modern corporations. Nowadays, these are led by managers, who are paid a fixed salary
and additionally receive a share of the firm's realized profits or turnover. However, the fixed
portion of the remuneration is usually much larger than the profit-related portion (Jensen and
Murphy 1990)2. The managers’ incentives may be different from those of traditional firm
owners and therefore it is questionable whether managerial firms behave like owner-led firms. 
The economic literature intensively discusses the consequences of managerial leadership of
the modern corporation. One topic is the effect of leadership on growth and the investment
behaviour related with this. It is frequently stated that managers - instead of following profit-
maximizing behavior - tend to invest too much into capital. The obvious reason for this is to
intensify growth of the firm, thus possibly raising personal income as well as personal pres-
tige and power.
The purpose of this paper is to point to another possible difference between managerial and
owner-led firms: The pursuit of innovative activity. We discuss the arguments against or in
favor of innovative activities of managerial firms and subsequently we present the results of
an empirical study concerning this topic. We use data from firms in five sectors concerning
seven European countries. All firms are small or medium sized with a maximum of 1000 em-
ployees. Overall, 474 observations can be used.
2 Theoretical Considerations
The discussion on managers leads directly to the well-known principal-agent models (see e.g.
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). The main question in these models is how to make the managers
act in the interest of the firms‘ capital owners. Naturally, owners want to maximize their prof-
its. Managers seek to optimize their monetary and non-monetary income which is related to
profits but also to firm size or similar characteristics. Empirical studies show that managerial
income is only weakly related to a firm‘s profitability but rather strongly to firm size (see e.g.
Leech and Leahy, 1991, or Kraft and Niederprüm, 1999). There is no clear explanation for
this phenomena. Rosen (1992) argues that the leader of a larger organization has a greater
responsibility and if he or she is successful, the marginal product will be higher than at the top
of a smaller company. Thus the mere observation of higher salaries paid by larger firms says
                                                
2 Several studies besides Jensen and Murphy (1990) have examined the dependence of management compensa-
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2nothing about the incentive structure. Zábojník (1998) explains sales maximization as a possi-
bility to solve the problem of underinvestment into specific human capital. Risk aversion of
the managers is clearly an explanation (see among others Holmström and Milgrom 1987) and
this leads to second-best solutions. The owners must take into account the risk aversion of the
managers, when they determine the salary. A very large variable component of the compen-
sation must be accompanied by a very large compensation of the associated risk, which means
the expected (mean) income must be very high in order to produce the certainty equivalent,
which matches the utility level of a lower but fixed remuneration. As a consequence the vari-
able part and the risk compensation have to be balanced, which however makes first-best so-
lutions impossible. 
If innovative activity by the managerial firm is considered, there are opposing forces at work.
Every investment into R&D activities is necessarily a risky undertaking. The outcome of such
an investment is unknown. This may perhaps have consequences for a manager, who is re-
sponsible for such decisions where failure might lead to job loss. Presumably this will only
occur if the projects have a great importance for the firm, but it is a possibility. This argument
would imply lower innovative activities than a traditional capitalist firm would perform. As
stated above, risk aversion is an important explanation of the weak correlation between profit-
ability and managers‘ salaries. R&D processes are by their very nature risky and therefore one
can argue that managers are reluctant to invest in such projects and prefer to follow estab-
lished investment and merger activities.
In contrast to the “risk argument“, an opposing “size effect“ might be present. It is a stylized
fact that managers' income and also prestige as well as personal power are directly related to
firm size. Therefore it is frequently hypothesized that manager-led firms tend to grow faster
than owner-led ones. The growth of firms is realized among other determinants by mergers
and capital investment. Many studies find that mergers are not profitable and therefore per-
sonal aims of managers must be responsible (among other reasons) for the observed merger
activities. Other studies find that manager-led firms invest too much into capital and that the
returns from investment are considerably smaller than the sum invested (Mueller, 1999). This
is evidence in favor of the so-called „free cash-flow hypothesis“ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Our point in this connection is the effect of leadership on innovative activity. The introduction
of new products and new processes is obviously a consequence of earlier R&D projects. Man-
agers may pursue more R&D than the owner-led firm as it will have an impact on the devel-
opment of new products and this in turn will lead to a larger sales volume. 
The theoretical discussion leads to contradictory effects. The managerial firm may show
more, equal or less innovative activity than the owner-led firm. The result depends on the
relative importance of the risk or size argument. Our topic is the empirical test of the behav-
iour of managers and owners. We try to investigate whether manager-led firms show more or
less innovative output than owner-led firms. Given the evidence with respect to investment
3and mergers it seems to be an interesting topic for empirical research to compare the manage-
rial firm with the owner-led firm. According to our knowledge until now no empirical study
has considered the effect of firm leadership and ownership on innovation performance of
firms. Given the importance of technical progress for individual firms as well as for the whole
economy, this question of leadership does not seem to be a trivial one.
3 Empirical Findings
This study uses survey data collected during a research project funded by the European
Commission. The survey was carried out by means of Computer Aided Telephone Interviews
(CATI). It is a cross-sectional survey which refers to the year 1999. The database contains
information on the firm level for five sectors: Food and Beverages (NACE3: 15), Chemicals
excluding pharmaceuticals (NACE 24 excluding 24.4), Manufacturing of Communication
Equipment (NACE 32), Telecom Services (NACE 64.2) and Computer Services (NACE 72).
The Countries included are Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the survey was restricted to firms with 10 to 1000 employ-
ees. This enables a comparison between countries, which typically have very different firm
size distributions, like e.g. Germany with many large firms and Greece with mainly smaller
ones. The typical respondent in the interviews is either the head of the R&D department or if
the firm did not have their own R&D lab, we contacted the person in charge of R&D activities
or innovation, respectively. Especially in the smaller firms, the interviewee often was the gen-
eral manager.
Our data contains only very limited information on R&D expenditures. We measure the suc-
cess of innovations as the share of sales resulting from significantly improved or new prod-
ucts developed during the recent three years (NewProd). This measure of innovative activity
is clearly an output of innovation projects and not an input as, for example, R&D. We do not
claim that our measure is superior to R&D or patents, but we think it is an interesting alterna-
tive to consider not only the pursuit of R&D projects but also the importance of the product
innovations determined by the market. Unsuccessful R&D activities which do not lead to new
products or newly developed products which have no success on the market are not measured
as innovations because in a market economy it is ultimately the customers who determine the
success of innovative activities. Our theoretical discussion considers R&D as the strategic
variable, which depends on the leadership in firms. However, for obvious reasons there is a
strong relation between R&D and the introduction of new products. Several other studies
were criticized because they only use input indicators like R&D expenditure to measure inno-
vation activities. Hansen (1992) argues: "Some firms may not be able to report resources de-
voted to innovation separately from resources devoted to other functions within the firm. If a
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4portion of the company president's time is devoted to innovation, for example, it is unlikely
that this portion of his or her salary will be counted in the R&D spending category". Espe-
cially, for small and medium sized enterprises this problem is likely to be true. Due to that
fact, small firms would systematically underreport their R&D expenditure. Regarding these
criticisms, we think that the share of turnover with new or improved products is is a useful
alternative measure of innovative activity, especially for our sample of small and medium
sized firms.
The explanatory variables include industry dummies which control for different technological
opportunities in the five sectors and country dummies that shift inter-country differences like
culture, organizational structures or market conditions. Furthermore, we control for size ef-
fects. We use the number of employees divided by 1000 (EMP). Additionally, a dummy vari-
able indicates whether the firm is led by an owner or a member of the owner’s family
(OWN = 1). OWN is zero otherwise. This identifies the managerial firms and the impact of
managers' leadership on innovative performance. Moreover, we add a dummy variable if a
firm continuously performs R&D activities (R&D = 1). Otherwise, R&D is zero. Firms that
undertake R&D permanently are expected to be more innovative than firms which only occa-
sionally carry out R&D or do not invest in their own R&D activities at all. Finally, we take
the pressure of competition into account: ln(COMP) is the log of the number of firms which
are considered as direct competitors in the main field of business by the interviewees. A high
competitive pressure may lead to intense investment into R&D and thus to many innovations
on the market. Of course the effect could also go into the other direction (Neo-Schumpeter
hypothesis). Overall, we use 474 observations in the following regression analyses. Descrip-
tive statistics of the variables used are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (474 observations)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
NewProd 39.02 28.93 0 100
EMP (in thousands) .17 .22 .002 1
R&D (continuous activities) .70 .46 0 1
OWN .50 .50 0 1
ln(COMP) 2.65 1.33 0 8.52
Industry Dummies
Food and Beverages .23 .42 0 1
Chemicals .22 .42 0 1
Communication Equipment .20 .40 0 1
Telecom/Computer Services .35 .48 0 1
Country Dummies
France .13 .33 0 1
Denmark .14 .35 0 1
Greece .21 .41 0 1
Netherlands .18 .39 0 1
Germany .12 .33 0 1
United Kingdom .08 .27 0 1
Italy .14 .35 0 1
5Of course, there is a relationship between leadership, R&D and firm size. The smaller firms
tend to be led by the owners and several do not perform R&D on a continuous basis. The cor-
relation between the number of employees and the ownership amounts to –0.3. The firm size
and continuous R&D activities exhibit a correlation of 0.15. Finally, the correlation between
the owner and the R&D variable is 0.14. This is no multicollinearity in the sense that it is
causing technical problems in the estimations.
Some firms did not introduce new or improved products to the market, i.e. some observations
are left censored. We take this restriction into account by estimating Tobit models (cf. e.g.
Greene, 1997, or Gourieroux, 2000). Let the latent variable *iy  of our econometric model be
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where   is the standard deviation to be estimated and   indicates the cumulative density
function of the standard normal distribution. 
First, we estimate a homoscedastic Tobit model. However, if heteroscedasticity occurs, the
homoscedastic model will lead to inconsistent estimates for both the standard errors and the
coefficients. Therefore, based on the homoscedastic model, we compute Lagrange multiplier
(LM) tests on heteroscedasticity (see Greene, 1997, p. 969). Because of the results of the LM
statistics, we consider a Tobit model with multiplicative heteroscedasticity (see Greene, 1997,
p. 967). We replace   with
 'expi iw    (4)
in the likelihood function (see equation 3). 'iw  denotes the vector of variables causing hetero-
scedasticity and   is a vector of additional parameters to be estimated.
Initially, we included EMP, industry dummies and country dummies in the heteroscedasticity
term. However, it turned out that the country dummies have no impact on the estimated vari-
ance and thus, we dropped them from the final specification. The results of both the homosce-
dastic model and the heteroscedastic one are given in Table 2. As the test statistics reject the
hypothesis of homoscedasticity, we only discuss the heteroscedastic model.
6Table 2: Tobit Regression Results (474 observations)
Dependent Variable: NewProd
Homoscedastic Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit a)
Exogeneous Variables Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
EMP -17.61 *** -2.80 -17.04 *** -3.25
R&D 10.40 *** 3.58 7.76 *** 2.77
OWN -6.57 ** -2.34 -5.98 ** -2.25
ln(COMP) .52 .52 -.08 -.08
Industry Dummies b)
- Chemicals 4.58 1.18 5.50 * 1.69
- Communication Equipment 22.16 *** 5.68 23.57 *** 6.64
- Telecom/Computer Services 26.77 *** 7.84 27.19 *** 8.83
Country Dummies c)
- Denmark -1.59 -.33 -.22 -.05
- Greece .93 .21 .85 .19
- Netherlands -8.04 * -1.74 -6.49 -1.51
- Germany 2.01 .39 5.22 1.06
- United Kingdom .80 .14 3.38 .56
- Italy -3.99 -.83 -3.28 -.78
Constant term 22.95 *** 4.28 24.33 *** 4.90
Log Likelihood -2,140.43 -2,124.31
LR test on joint significance of
country dummies ~ (6) d) 7.16 9.31
Notes: *** report a significance level of 1%, ** of 5% and * of 10%.
a) The heteroscedastic Tobit model contains industry dummies and EMP in the heteroscedasticity
term. The estimates are not reported, but available upon request.
b) Reference class: Food and Beverages
c) Reference class: France.
d) The critical value for rejection of the null hypothesis that all country dummies are jointly zero
is 12.59 (10.64) at the 5% (10%) significance level.
The estimates show that firms which are led by managers are clearly more innovative than
others. This is a remarkable result as it states that leadership of a firm does indeed have an
effect on innovation. The impact of leadership by managers is established for investment and
merger activities but until now not for innovations.
The other results are interesting as well: There are no differences among countries regarding
the innovative performance of firms. The LR statistic on joint significance of the country
dummies indicates that the hypothesis „all country dummies are jointly zero“ cannot be re-
jected.
The dummy variable which indicates continuous R&D activities of the firm is positively sig-
nificant. Moreover, the share of turnover with new products is decreasing with size. We also
tested non-linear relationships, but it turned out that that a linear specification of size suffices.
7This result is in line with Hansen (1992) who studied the relationship between the share of
sales with new products introduced in the recent five years and firm size or age. Hansen also
finds a negative sign for firm size. Younger and smaller firms were more innovative in his
study. However, the relation between innovation input and output requires closer investiga-
tion, but this question is beyond the scope of the present paper.
The industry dummies report that the manufacturers of communication equipment as well as
the telecom and computer services are more innovative than the "traditional" industries of
chemical or food and beverages production. This result is most likely a reflection of the prod-
uct life-cycle in these industries.
Some readers may worry about the application of the Tobit model because it is a special case
of a selection model (often called generalized Tobit model), in which one usually models two
firm decisions. First, a firm has to decide whether to innovate or not. Besides this propensity
to innovate, firms have to determine how much to innovate by a second decision. The Tobit
model incorporates both decisions by assuming that the explanatory variables driving both
decisions enter the two equations with the same magnitude. Applying a Tobit model, we as-
sume that there is an underlying structural model for the unobserved variable *y . However,
we only observe y > 0 if the propensity to innovate is also larger than zero. If this propensity
is below zero, we only observe y = 0. As this construction of the model may seem a little arti-
ficial to some people, we also estimate a fractional response model, which treats the depend-
ent variable just naturally as a share which is bound between zero and one.4
Following the methodology described in Papke and Wooldridge (1996), we now assume that 
   ' '|i i iE y x G x  (5)
where G is a function satisfying  '0 1iG x   . This ensures that all predicted values of y lie
between zero and one. As G we choose the cumulative density function of the standard nor-
mal distribution:  'ix  . The estimation procedure is a particular quasi-likelihood method
(QMLE) based on Gourieroux et al. (1984) and McCullagh and Nelder (1989). The Bernoulli
log-likelihood function is given as
       ' 'ln 1 ln 1i i i i il y x y x             . (6)
This corresponds to the familiar log-likelihood of the Probit model, except that we allow iy
being continuous in the interval (0,1). Estimates for   are obtained from the maximization
problem  
1
max
N
i
i
l



 . According to Papke and Wooldridge, the QMLE is consistent and
N -asymptotically normal regardless of the distribution of iy  conditional on ix .The results
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8of the estimation are displayed in Table 3. The standard errors are computed robust as sug-
gested in Papke and Wooldridge (1996, p. 622-3) to obtain the 'true' asymptotic variance.
Note, that in the Tobit estimates Newprod has been measured in percentage points, i.e. in the
interval (0,100), but for the estimation of the fractional response model we have rescaled it to
the interval (0,1).
Table 3: QMLE results of the model for a fractional response variable (474 obs.)
Dependent Variable: NewProd
Exogeneous Variables Coefficient z-value
EMP -.47 *** -2.92
R&D .26 *** 3.38
OWN -.17 ** -2.21
ln(COMP) .02 .57
Industry Dummies b)
- Chemicals .17 * 1.71
- Communication Equipment .62 *** 6.35
- Telecom/Computer Services .73 *** 8.35
Country Dummies c)
- Denmark -.04 -.28
- Greece .03 .26
- Netherlands -.20 * -1.65
- Germany .05 .35
- United Kingdom .03 .20
- Italy -.12 -.95
Constant term -.73 *** -4.81
Quasi Log Likelihood -298.16
Notes: *** report a significance level of 1%, ** of 5% and * of 10%.
b) Reference class: Food and Beverages
c) Reference class: France.
We have also carried out a general functional form diagnostic to check for possible unob-
served heterogeneity in the model. This test is an extension of the RESET procedure to index
models and is described on page 625 in the paper of Papke and Wooldridge. We test whether
quadratic and cubic terms of 'ix   cause a rejection of our model specification as given in
equation (5). We compute the robust LM statistic which is distributed 2  with two degrees of
freedom. The value of the LM statistic in our case is 1.65 (p-value = 0.44) which means that
our specification as presented in Table 3 passes the test and, thus, does not need to be re-
jected. 
The results reveal those of the Tobit models: Owner-led firms have significantly smaller
shares of sales with new products than manager-led companies. The share of innovative sales
is negatively related to firm size. Firms that engage permanently in R&D activities reach
9larger shares of sales with product innovations. Again, we find significant differences among
industries but not among countries.
4 Conclusions
We present the results of an empirical study on the innovation activities of European firms.
Our dependent variable is the share of sales, which can be attributed to newly developed
products. Both Tobit regressions and a quasi maximum likelihood estimator for models of a
fractional response variable point to the same conclusion: It turns out, that managerial led
firms have a larger share than the other firms. 
This is important empirical evidence concerning the effects of leadership on the behavior of
firms. While the impact of managers has been discussed in other connections, it has been ne-
glected with respect to innovation. 
A welfare theoretic evaluation of this result is controversial. Economists usually favour the
view that the capital owners are most knowledgeable regarding what has to be done to maxi-
mize profits and therefore they will invest the profit-maximizing amount of R&D. This in turn
implies that the managerial firms invest too much if profit maximization is the aim. 
However, innovations have strong spill-over effects to other firms and these positive exter-
nalities may change the evaluation of innovative activity from a social point of view. With
these externalities in mind, owner-led firms may invest too little into innovation while man-
agers are closer to the social optimum. However, they do this in order to maximize their own
interests and do not think about a socially desirable level of innovation and, hence, it would
be pure coincidence if the social optimum of innovation is reached.
10
References
Fizel, J.L. and K. Louie (1990), CEO Retention, Firm Performance and Corporate Govern-
ance, Managerial and Decision Economics 11, 167-176.
Gibbons, R. and K. Murphy (1990), Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive
Officers, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (supplement), 30S-51S.
Gilson, S.C. (1989), Management Turnover and Financial Distress, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 25, 241-262.
Gourieroux, C. (2000), Econometrics of Qualitative Dependent Variables, Cambridge.
Gourieroux, C., A. Monfort and A. Trognon (1984), Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods:
Theory, Econometrica 52, 681-700.
Greene, W.H. (1997), Econometric Analysis, 3rd ed., New York.
Hansen, J.A. (1992), Innovation, Firm Size, and Firm Age, Small Business Economics 4, 37-
44.
Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom (1987), Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of In-
tertemporal Incentives, Econometrica 55, 303-328.
Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Jensen, M.C. and K.J. Murphy (1990), Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,
Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-264.
Kaplan, S.N. (1994a), Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany, Journal
of Law, Economics & Organization 10, 142-159.
Kaplan, S.N. (1994b), Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Ja-
pan and the United States, Journal of Political Economy 102, 510-546.
Kraft, K. and A. Niederprüm (1999), Determinants of Management Compensation with Risk-
Averse Agents and Dispersed Ownership of the Firm, Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 40, 17-27.
Leech, D. and J. Leahy (1991), Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications and the
Performance of Large British Companies, Economic Journal 101, 1418-1437.
11
Main, B.G.M. (1991), Top Executive Pay and Performance, Managerial and Decision Eco-
nomics 12, 219-229.
McCullagh, P. and J.A. Nelder (1989), Generalized Linear Models, 2nd ed., New York.
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1992), Economics, Organization and Management, Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs.
Mueller, D.C. (1999), On the Economic Decline of Nations, in: D.C. Mueller, A. Haid and J.
Weigand (eds.) Competition, Efficiency, and Welfare, Boston, 351-381.
Papke, L.E. and J.M. Wooldridge (1996), Econometric Methods for fractional response vari-
ables with an application to 401(K) plan participation rates, Journal of Applied Economet-
rics 11, 619-632.
Rosen, S. (1992), Contracts and the Market for Executives, in: L. Werin and H. Wijkander
(eds.), Contract Economics, Oxford, 181-211.
Warner, J.B., R.C. Watts and K.H. Wruck (1988), Stock Prices and Top Management
Changes, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 461-492.
Weisbach, M.S. (1988), Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 20, 431-460.
Zábojník, J. (1998), Sales Maximization and Specific Human Capital, RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics 29, 790-802.
